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Abstract
We exploit a change in lending laws to estimate the causal effect of
restricting access to payday loans on liquor sales. Leveraging lender-
and liquor store-level data, we find that the changes reduce sales, with
the largest decreases at stores located nearest to lenders. By focusing
on states with state-run liquor monopolies, we account for supply side
variables that are typically unobserved. Our results are the first to
quantify how credit constraints affect spending on liquor, and suggest
mechanisms underlying some loan usage. These results illustrate that
the benefits of lending restrictions extend beyond personal finance and
may be large.
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1 Introduction
The practice of short-term consumer financing known as payday lending re-
mains controversial because the theoretical gains in welfare from greater credit
access stand in opposition to anecdotal evidence that many borrowers are made
worse off. Advocates for the industry assert that the loans fill a gap in credit
access for underserved individuals facing temporary financial hardship. Op-
ponents, who include many state legislatures and the Obama administration,
argue that lenders target financially vulnerable individuals with little ability
to pay down their principal, who may end up paying many times the borrowed
amount in interest and fees.1
Despite uncertainty surrounding the benefits to borrowers, there exists a
surprising lack of evidence on the impact of payday lending on consumption.
An exception is Melzer (2011), which finds that extending access to payday
lending leads to more instances of individuals delaying purchases of necessities
such as medical care, dental care and prescription drugs. In this paper, we
explore the ways that access to payday lending affects consumption along
another margin: the demand for liquor. This is a particularly interesting
market to study because, far from being a necessity, liquor is widely regarded as
a non-essential consumption good whose use and abuse is associated with a vast
1In his March 28, 2015 weekly address, President Obama stated that “while payday loans
might seem like easy money, folks often end up trapped in a cycle of debt.”
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array of health consequences, anti-social behaviors and negative externalities.2
Regulations restricting both payday loan and liquor access seek to minimize
the potential for overuse.3 To justify intervention in the two markets, policy
makers note a host of negative externalities associated with each product,
and cite behavioral motivations underlying individuals’ consumption decisions.
In particular, researchers have shown that the same models of impulsivity
and dynamically inconsistent decision making - hyperbolic preferences and
the cue theory of consumption - used to describe the demand for alcohol,
also describe patterns of payday loan usage.4 In these models, individuals
can objectively benefit from a restricted choice set that limits their access to
loans and liquor. The overlap in behavioral characteristics of over users of
both products suggests that liquor represents an area particularly responsive
to changes in payday lending regulations.
To identify the causal effect of lending restrictions on liquor sales, we ex-
ploit a change in payday lending laws in the State of Washington. Leverag-
2The World Health Organization estimates that there is a causal relation between al-
cohol consumption and more than 200 medical conditions. Among males, approximately
7.6% of world-wide mortality in 2012 was attributable to alcohol (World Health Organi-
zation (2014)). The economics literature, in work largely though not exclusively focusing
on young drinkers finds alcohol to be a contributor to a diverse range of problems. While
not exhaustive, this includes more premature mortality, vehicle fatalities, and suicides (Dee
(1999); Carpenter (2004); Carpenter and Dobkin (2009)), crime and violence (Carpenter
(2005b); Carpenter (2007); Biderman et al. (2010), Luca et al. (2015)), risky sexual activity
and teenage pregnancy (Dee (2001b); Chesson et al. (2000); Carpenter (2005a)), poorer
infant health (Fertig and Watson (2009)), and lower earnings and educational attainment
(Renna (2007)). Evidence supports that some of these consequences result from both own
as well as peer alcohol use (Waddell (2012)).
3For example, the Washington State Liquor Control Board lists reduced state-wide
per-capita consumption of alcohol as a primary benefit of the state’s alcohol distribution
monopoly (Washington State Liquor Control Board Business Plan 2007-2009 ).
4 See Laibson (2001) for cue theory and Skiba and Tobacman (2008) and Vuchinich and
Simpson (1998) for hyperbolic preferences, payday lending, and consumption.
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ing lender- and liquor store-level data, we estimate a difference-in-differences
model comparing Washington to the neighboring State of Oregon, which did
not experience a change in payday lending laws during this time. Importantly,
by focusing on states with state-run liquor monopolies, we can address supply-
side competitive effects, such as price changes, or store openings and closings,
that normally would confound this identification strategy for a generic con-
sumption good. We find that the law change leads to a significant reduction
in liquor sales, with the largest decreases occurring at liquor stores located
very near to payday lenders at the time the law took effect. Our results pro-
vide compelling evidence on how credit constraints affect consumer spending,
suggest a behavioral mechanism that may underly some payday loan usage,
and provide evidence that the Washington law likely reduced one form of loan
overuse.
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we review previous work
studying the payday lending industry, its impact on communities, and poten-
tial links to liquor demand. We also explain the legal landscape for payday
lenders and liquor stores in Washington and Oregon, establish the impact of
the Washington law change on the state-wide prevalence of loans and lenders,
and discuss the data. We present our empirical results in Section 3, and in
Section 4, we conclude with a summary of the findings, and implications for
policy.
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2 Background
The term “payday loan” describes a form of short-term consumer credit tra-
ditionally offered at storefronts specializing in the loans.5 In a typical trans-
action, a borrower writes a personal check to the lender to be cashed on the
borrower’s next payday. In exchange for the check, the borrower receives cash
equal to the loan amount net of all fees and interest subtracted upfront.
While on average, loans are small (around $375), three factors make them
potentially more risky than other forms of credit. First, the cost of borrowing
is high when converted into an annual percentage rate (APR). Individuals
typically pay $15 to $25 in fees per $100 borrowed (an APR of approximately
390% to 650% for a typical loan). Second, the short duration of the loans
(generally 14 days or fewer) leaves little time for a meaningful improvement in
borrowers’ finances. This contributes to a third issue which is that most loans
are taken to repay a prior payday loan (Burke et al. (2014)). In some states,
this pattern can continue, ad infinitum, transforming a relatively small loan
into a regular liability paid two or three times per month.
Estimates of the size of the payday loan industry vary. Bair (2005) and
Stegman (2007) put annual loan volume as high as 50 billion dollars in 2004
spread across 22,000 lending storefronts. More recent estimates made by the
Pew Charitable Trust (PCT) put the number of store fronts at 20,000 in 2010
with a smaller loan volume. The slow down in the industry’s growth likely
5In recent years, online payday lenders have grown in popularity, however, they remain a
small portion of the market with approximately 16% of surveyed individuals indicating that
they rely exclusively on internet payday lenders for loans. Additionally, survey evidence
suggests that most individuals opt to forego loans rather than utilize online lenders when
states restrict payday lenders (Bourke et al. (2012)).
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represents the effect of greater regulation enacted in a number of states. De-
spite the new regulations, PCT estimates that 12 million Americans received
a payday loan in 2010, including nine percent of individuals with annual earn-
ings less than $15,000, and eleven percent of people earning between $15,000
and $25,000 (Bourke et al. (2012)).
While sound financial conduct would likely dictate refraining from using
payday loans to obtain liquor, it is plausible that not all borrowers act with
such restraint. First, survey evidence finds that eight percent of borrowers
indicate that their first loan was used primarily for “something special, such
as a vacation, entertainment, or gifts,” and five percent said that they used
it to purchase food and groceries (Bourke et al. (2012)). In another survey
of borrowers, Bertrand and Morse (2009) find that more than nine percent
of respondents are “temptation spenders” who report using loans for vaca-
tions, eating out, entertainment, gifts, apparel or electronics. Additionally,
both payday loan users and heavy drinkers exhibit behavior consistent with
present-biased hyperbolic preferences (Skiba and Tobacman (2008) and Vu-
chinich and Simpson (1998), respectively), further suggesting a willingness
to use expensive credit to finance liquor purchases. Furthermore, that some
drinkers may choose to satisfy impulsive desires for alcohol through payday
loans is consistent with behavioral explanations of impulsivity and addiction
such as Laibson (2001) cue theory of consumption. Finally, if payday lend-
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ing increases financial distress,6 research suggests that greater alcohol use and
abuse may be expected.7
2.1 Lending in Oregon and Washington
Washington State enacted HB 1709 on January, 1st 2010, which introduced
three new major restrictions to the payday loan industry. First the law lim-
ited the size of a payday loan to 30% of a person’s monthly income or $700,
whichever is less. Second the law created a statewide database to track the
issuance of payday loans in order to set a hard cap on the number of loans an
individual could obtain in a twelve month period to eight, and eliminated mul-
tiple concurrent loans. This effectively prohibited the repayment of an existing
loan with a new one.8 In the year prior to the law, the State of Washington
6Research on the impact of payday lending on indicators of financial distress finds mixed
results. Evidence supporting a positive correlation (i.e. loan use positively correlated with
distress) includes Campbell et al. (2012), Melzer (2011), and Carrell and Zinman (2014)
which find that loan access leads to more involuntary bank account closures, difficulty paying
bills, and lower job preparedness, respectively. Skiba and Tobacman (2011) and Morgan et
al. (2012) link greater loan access to higher bankruptcy rates, though Hynes (2012) finds
the opposite. Alternatively, the volume of bounced checks (Morgan et al. (2012)), and
borrower-reported financial distress (Zinman (2010)) go up after payday loan bans (even
though the probability of making a late payment on a bill appears to go down). Results
from Morse (2011) indicate that the presence of lenders mitigates foreclosure and crime rate
rises after unforeseen natural disasters. Bhutta (2014) and Bhutta et al. (2015) find no
effects of payday lending on credit scores.
7In particular, Peirce et al. (1994) and San Jose et al. (2000) both document a pos-
itive relationship between stress and alcohol consumption in survey data on alcohol use.
This relationship also appears in studies of the effect of unemployment on alcoholic con-
sumption. Dee (2001a) and Ruhm and Black (2002) show that, although the income effect
dominates during economic downturns leading to procyclical alcohol consumption, financial
stress related drinking appears to rise with binge drinking increasing and moderate drinkers
increasing their consumption.
8Prior to the new law, Washington prohibited lenders from issuing roll-over loans that
allowed borrowers to pay a fee to delay cashing existing checks. Rather than deter financial
irresponsibility, we believe this feature may have strengthened the link between loans and
impulse spending because customers obtaining new loans to repay existing debts needed to
physically handle a greater volume of cash.
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estimated that roughly one third of all payday loan borrowers took out more
than eight loans.9 Finally, the law mandated that borrowers were entitled to
an 90 day instalment plan to pay back loans of $400 or less or 180 days for
loans over $400.
The effect of the law on the industry was severe. There were 603 payday
loan locations active in Washington in 2009 that were responsible for 3.24 mil-
lion loans worth $1.366 billion according to Washington Division of Financial
Institutions.10 In the year following the law change, the number of payday
lenders dropped to 424, and loan volume fell to 1.09 million loans worth only
$434 million. The following year the number of locations fell again to 256
with a loan volume of roughly 900,000 worth $330 million. Today there are
fewer than 200 lenders in Washington and the total loan volume and value has
stabilized close to the 2011 values.
Oregon enacted similar payday lending restrictions in August of 2007. The
law capped loans at 30% of income or $700, whichever is less; borrowers could
only apply for eight loans in a calendar year, and are entitled to similar instal-
ment plans as Washington borrowers. The Oregon law also effectively reduced
the number of payday lenders. Payday lender numbers dropped from 370 in
2006 to 82 by 2008. Oregon’s payday laws have remained unchanged since,
and the number of active payday lenders has held constant.11
Throughout our observation period, both states require payday lenders to
92009 Payday Lending Report authored by the Washington State Department of Finan-
cial Institutions.
10Washington’s reports are available online at http://www.dfi.wa.gov/reports/payday-
lending-reports.
11We do not possess data to similarly estimate the effect of Oregon’s law change on liquor
sales using Washington as a counterfactual.
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hold special licenses to operate. The licensing information is publicly available
and includes information on when a license was issued and when it expired, the
street address of the store, and the parent company. Figure 1 shows the pay-
day lender counts in Oregon and Washington from July 2008 through March
2012 from the licensing data. The time frame corresponds to the period for
which we have liquor sales data. Entry into the count occurs on the date a
license is issued and exit occurs when the last observed license expires. The
majority of Washington lenders exit in April, which coincides with the annual
audit of lenders by the state. According to the Washington Division of Fi-
nancial Institutions, there are no rules, however, that force firms to exit in
this month. Washington experiences major declines in lenders beginning in
the years following the payday lending restrictions, while Oregon’s count is
practically unchanged.12
2.2 Liquor Sales in Oregon and Washington
A crucial feature of our estimation strategy involves accounting for potentially
endogenous supply side factors that challenge efforts to separately identify
changes in demand from the store response to the change. To do so, we focus
on liquor control states, in which the state determines the number and location
of liquor stores, the products offered, and harmonizes prices across stores to
regulate and restrict liquor access. Oregon and Washington were both liquor
12The counts given in the Washington Division of Financial Institutions annual reports
cited previously differ slightly from our own. We believe differences are due to the counts
being done at different points in the year, or differences in counting temporarily expired
licenses, and as we have received our data from the same agency, we have no reason to
doubt its comprehensiveness.
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control states until June of 2012 (Washington privatized liquor sales in June
2012).13 In what follows, we describe the relevant operation and price setting
policies in effect during the period of interest.
The prices in each state are set according to publicly known formulas and
published in advance. These formulas and the applicable taxes differ between
the two states and are periodically revised. On average liquor prices in Ore-
gon during the period of study are $1.80 per bottle less than in Washington
including tax. A majority of this difference reflects the absence of sales tax in
Oregon.
There were two revisions to the pricing formulas in Oregon and Washington
that occurred around the time of the Washington law change. Oregon added
a $0.50 per bottle surcharge in April of 2009 and Washington increased the
markup (over wholesale price not including taxes) on all bottles from 39.2%
to 51.9% in August 2009, which resulted in an average total price increase of
$0.67 for all items observed at the universal product code level. No additional
changes in formulas occurred through the end of our sample (March 2012),
although, observed retail prices in Washington fell by an average of $0.60 in
the two years following the initial price increase, while Oregon’s remained
steady.14 In addition, the formula revisions had an equally small effect on the
minimum price of liquor in each state. The minimum price of liquor is noted
13The agencies for Washington and Oregon are the Washington State Liquor Control
Board and the Oregon Liquor Control Commission. The structure of the state monopolies
are slightly different. Oregon owns all alcohol sold in the state and contracts individuals or
firms to operate stores where the alcohol is sold. Washington on the other hand operated
mostly state owned store where sales were conducted by state employees.
14Although we possess liquor sales data through June 2012, we end our sample in March
to avoid any changes in relative sales that may have occurred due to the privatization of
liquor sales in Washington.
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in the public health literature as a key determinate in reducing overall alco-
hol consumption since the variety of price points in the alcohol market allow
for easy substitution in response to price changes (Stockwell et al. (2012)).15
Therefore, the absence of diverging prices between the two states leads us to
believe that changes in prices over time do not underly the changes in monthly
liquor sales we observe.
Figure 2 shows the total number of liquor stores and liquor stores per
100,000 residents in the two states over time. Oregon and Washington both
increase the number of stores in operation over our sample. However, the per
capita graph shows that these increase are largely offset by population growth.
The increase in Washington stores was part of a slow push to increase liquor
access beginning in 2009 and was accompanied by an increase in store open
hours and days of operation.16 The effect of this push with respect to our
estimates of the effect of the payday lending law change is ambiguous. The
increase in stores may bias our estimates towards finding a negative effect of
the law change, while the increase in store hours and days of operation may
bias the estimates towards finding a positive effect. As a result, we consider a
number of specifications to address these sources of bias.
For this study, we use monthly store-level sales data provided by Oregon’s
and Washington’s respective liquor control agencies from July 2008 through
March 2012. Figure 3 shows total monthly sales in Oregon and Washington
15In both states during our sample period, a 750ml bottle of 80 proof whiskey, vodka,
gin, rum, and tequila were each available for under $10 including tax. A summary table of
liquor prices is included in the Appendix. Historical liquor prices are available for the two
states on request.
16Source: Press release from Washington Liquor Control Board data June 24, 2009.
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over our sample period adjusted for inflation.17 Besides the level difference in
sales between the states, Oregon sales appear to be a reasonable counterfactual
for Washington sales. Both states exhibit similar but large seasonality in liquor
sales, with December sales nearly twice as large as January’s in some years,
and increasing sales over time.
3 Empirics
To retrieve the causal effect of the lending restrictions on liquor sales, we em-
ploy a difference-in-difference (DD) style estimator, with Oregon stores serv-
ing as the counterfactual for Washington stores. This is a valid identification
strategy if the trend in Oregon’s liquor store sales follow the same trend that
would have been observed in Washington’s stores in the absence of a reduction
in credit access. The most parsimonious DD OLS regression model estimates
the effects of the payday lending restrictions on store i’s log consumer liquor
sales in month t without conditioning on controls or fixed effects:
ln(Salesit) = α + β1Post Lawt + β2WAi + β3Post Lawt ×WAi + it (1)
where Post Lawt is a binary variable equalling one in the months after Wash-
ington’s law change, and WAi is an indicator variable for Washington liquor
stores. The coefficient associated with the interaction, β3, represents the causal
17We adjust the sales data for inflation using the CPI measure for Food and Beverages.
The available liquor price data though suggests that movements in liquor prices were much
smaller than those implied by CPI inflation. However, we find that adjusting for inflation
has little effect on the point estimates or our regressions.
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effect of the lending restrictions. However, this specification may be susceptible
to potential unobserved store characteristics, fixed over time, and correlated
with sales and the Post Lawt ×WAi term, which may bias estimates of the
causal effect of the law change. Additionally, as demonstrated in Figure 3,
there exists substantial seasonality in liquor sales. The degree to which each
store is affected by this seasonality may vary (e.g. liquor stores next to shop-
ping malls may experience greater seasonality than those located in suburbs),
which motives a specification that includes store-by-month (e.g. January)
fixed effects, αim:
ln(Salesit) = αim + γ1Post Lawt + γ2Post Lawt ×WAi + it (2)
Figure 4 plots estimated residuals from a regression of log liquor store sales
on a set of store-by-month fixed effects, averaged over state and quarter.18 The
graph possesses three notable features. First, prior to Washington’s lending
restrictions (indicated by the vertical dashed line), both states’ log sales trend
in parallel, confirming the plausibility of the “common trends” assumption of
the DD model. Second, a persistent gap in the states’ sales appears in the
same quarter as the law change. This gap is the result of a relatively large
downward movement in Washington’s sales compared to Oregon’s, consistent
with a negative effect of the law on sales. Finally, the effect appears to be
a permanent level shift down, yet sales in both states maintain a common
upward trend.
18As one would expect, store fixed effects alone fail to remove the apparent seasonality.
Figure A1 plots log consumer sales, net of store fixed effects, and averaged by month and
year.
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Although Figure 4’s apparent confirmation that sales in both states’ follow
common trends prior to the lending restrictions, we can further relax the re-
quirements for identification and likely reduce residual variance with the inclu-
sion of relevant control variables. Therefore, we introduce both store-specific
and regional control variables to equation (2). For regional economic factors,
we include the monthly unemployment rate and annual household median in-
come measured at the county level, and the annual proportion of residents
living below the U.S. poverty line measured at zip code level. For store op-
erations, we include indicator variables to account for changes in sales driven
by temporary store closures, store locations moves, and possible competitive
effects of new stores entering the market. To control for the effect of new en-
trants, we create an indicator variable that takes a one in all months following
the opening of a new liquor store for any existing liquor store within a one
kilometer radius to separate changes in sales due to competition from those
associated with the law change.19 Finally, in order to correct for possible bias
in the estimated parameters of these controls driven by time-specific shocks,
we remove arbitrary trending over time with the inclusion of year-by-month
fixed effects, τmy. Like the control variables, these fixed effects may provide
additional efficiency gains. Our preferred specification is therefore given by
the following equation:
ln(Salesit) = αim + τmy + δ1Post Lawt ×WAi + xitb + it. (3)
19The information on new stores, store closures, changing hours, and store moves is ob-
tained from archived press releases published on the two states liquor control websites.
Further explanation of the variables are given in Table A2 in the Appendix.
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Table 1 reports the estimated causal effect of Washington’s payday lend-
ing restrictions on store consumer liquor sales. Columns 1 and 2 report the
results without and with control variables, respectively. Estimated standard
errors account for any clustering that may occur at the county-level.20 Our
preferred specification with controls (column 2) indicates that the payday lend-
ing restrictions reduced liquor store sales by approximately 3.6% (statistically
significant at the 1% level). As average Washington liquor sales were approxi-
mately $163,000 in the months prior to the law change, this represents a $5,900
decline per store each month. At the state level, the point estimate implies a
$23.5 million dollar ($5,900 × 333 liquor stores × 12 months) annual decrease
in liquor sales. As Washington State reported that the law decreased payday
loans by $932 million from 2009 to 2010, this decline represents approximately
2.5% of the change in total value of loans issued.
The final column of Table 1 reports the dynamic effects of the lending
restrictions in the year prior to the law change, and after, relative to months
more than one year before. There is no evidence of an effect on sales prior to
the law change, and the effect on liquor sales appears to increase somewhat in
years after the law change. Because payday lenders continued to exit through
2011, and the nature of the cap limiting borrowers to eight loans per twelve-
month period, this larger effect on liquor sales over time is consistent with
progressively tightening credit constraints.
We also consider and rule out three other possible explanations for the
20Table A3 in the Appendix shows that while unadjusted standard errors are less than
half the size of these, there is little difference between correcting for clustering at the store-,
city- or county-level.
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estimates not captured by the controls: unobserved competition effects not
captured by the new entrants indicator variable, other law changes affecting
liquor sales, and changes in cross-border liquor purchases following the law
change due to the fact that Oregon and Washington share a populated border.
While Figure 2 indicates that both states have little change in per-capita store
numbers over time, we further investigate the role of new entrants on existing
liquor store sales by estimating the effect of the law change on sales collapsed
to the city-level. Estimates in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 indicate that,
while entry may play a small role in determining store-level sales, significant
reductions in liquor sales occur at the city-level.21
To account for other possible law changes, we conducted a review of Wash-
ington and Oregon legislation proposed and passed during the 2009 legislative
sessions and contacted the Washington State Liquor Control Board and the
Washington State Division of Financial Institutions, the regulator of payday
lenders, to specifically ask about alternative explanations. The only relevant
changes we identified from our research and conversations with regulators were
those already discussed in Section 2. Finally, Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 use
store-level observations with our preferred specification to demonstrate that
the results are robust to dropping the border counties from the sample. This
is important as Melzer (2011) finds significant evidence of individuals’ willing-
ness to traverse state borders to obtain payday loans. If the observed effect
21It is important to note that we do not expect the point estimates in Table 2 to equal
those in our main specification unless heterogeneity in response to the lending restrictions
is orthogonal to the number of stores operating in a city. When the data is collapsed to the
city-level, observations from cities with few liquor stores receive relatively greater weight
than those compared to the store-level regressions.
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of lending restrictions is primarily driven by reduced economic activity at the
border, dropping these stores should yield insignificant estimates. However,
this is not observed.
3.1 Effects in urban versus rural counties
Heterogeneity in payday loan usage suggests that not all communities’ liquor
stores may experience the effects of lending restrictions similarly. One margin
along which stratification might prove informative is between the states’ large
metropolitan areas versus smaller or more rural communities. The nation-wide
survey of borrowers by PCT finds seven percent of individuals living in urban
areas have used payday loans, which “is significantly higher than the three
percent of suburban-area residents who report having used payday loans.” The
report implicates race as another observable predictor of payday loan usage
(twelve percent of African Americans report using a payday loan compared
to four percent of whites). Race and geography may directly influence usage
patterns or merely proxy for characteristics that do.
Table 3 presents estimates of the effects of payday loan restrictions on
individual liquor store sales from equation (3) separately for counties with a
large metro area and counties considered part of the fringe (columns 1 and 2),
and counties with smaller populations (columns 3 and 4).22 Apparent from
this table is that while liquor stores are more numerous in smaller counties,
average sales per store are higher in the high population density counties,
22County size definitions follow the Centers for Disease Control’s National Center for
Health Statistics county urbanicity classification definitions.
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representing the non-uniform geographic distribution of residents.23
In line with greater loan usage, per capita, and access in densely populated
areas, the effect of the credit ban reduces liquor sales by slightly less than six
percent (significant at the 1% level), on average in large metro core and outly-
ing counties, whereas the restrictions reduce sales in smaller metropolitan and
non-core areas by only two-and-a-half percent (p-value=0.06). The estimates
of the dynamic effect pre- and post-law change again point to no statistically
significant effect prior to the law change, and a slightly increasing effect from
year one to two-plus years post restrictions.
3.2 Discussion
We see two primary explanations (not mutually exclusive) for the decline in
Washington liquor sales in response to the law change. First, the effect may
be part of a wider permanent reduction in consumption as households lose
their ability to cope with unforeseen negative income shocks. Alternatively,
the drop in spending may indicate a more direct financing of liquor purchases
by individuals with present-biased preferences. The first explanation implies
that restrictions on payday lending negatively affect consumer welfare, while
the second allows for a positive impact, since individuals with present-biased
preferences may be made objectively better off with a restricted choice set.
Zinman (2013) highlights Laibson (2001)’s theory of Pavlovian cues as a
particularly intriguing explanation for payday loan usage. In these models,
consumer “impulsivity” makes instant gratification a special case during dy-
23Over the considered time period, total sales of alcohol was thirty percent higher in the
large metropolitan counties.
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namic utility maximization, where exposure to a cue can explain dynamically
inconsistent behavior. Indeed, Laibson uses liquor as a prime example of
consumption thought to be influenced by cues, and subsequent experimental
research on liquor provides evidence consistent with this hypothesis (MacKil-
lop et al. (2010)). In situations where payday lenders locate very near to
liquor stores, individuals may be exposed to a cue for alcohol, and then see
the lender as a means to satisfy the urge to make an immediate purchase. A
lender and liquor store separated by even a brief walk may be far enough apart
to allow an individual to resist the urge to obtain both the loan and liquor. Of
course, cue-theory of consumption makes lender-liquor store distance relevant
even in circumstances where individuals experience a cue only after borrowing.
Lenders locating near liquor stores increase the likelihood that an individual
exposed to a cue is financially liquid, and able to act on an impulse.
In the following section, we investigate the relevancy of a store’s distance to
a lender on the magnitude of the effect of the law change. We hypothesize that
a relationship between distance and effect size that is sufficiently non-linear
such that it cannot be justified based upon increased travel costs alone would
be consistent with behavioral explanations of demand.
3.3 Store Sales and Lender Proximity
To investigate liquor store and lender proximity, we geocode the stores’ and
lenders’ street addresses, and calculate walking distances for all liquor store-
lender pairs within two kilometers of one another.24 We then repeatedly esti-
24See the data appendix for a description of the geocoding procedure.
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mate equation (3) with our full set of controls on an ever expanding window
of liquor stores beginning with the stores that were located within a ten meter
walking distance of a lender in the month prior to the law change, then within
100 meters, within 200 meters, etc., to two kilometers.25,26 We believe that a
two kilometer walking distance represents a reasonable upper bound for which
distance remains a salient predictor of cue-driven sales.27 These estimates are
presented in Figure 5. The graph demonstrates a negative effect of 9.2% on
those liquor stores that had a payday lender located within ten meters in the
month before the law change (significant at the 1% levels), an effect almost
three times as large as that overall.2829 The larger effect rapidly declines in
distance suggesting that even a small degree of separation is significant. The
degree of nonlinearity in the relationship between distance and liquor sales
supports the behavioral explanation of demand.
25Appendix figure A2 gives the cumulative number of liquor stores by distance to the
nearest lender in the month before the law change.
26We use the walking distance in the month before the Washington law change, rather
than a more time-dynamic measure such as as openings and closings post-law because these
are likely to be endogenous decisions. We see distance prior to the law change as a plausible
proxy for a liquor store’s reliance on lenders leading up to the lending restrictions, and then
measure the reduced form impact on sales, which includes potential endogenous relocation
of stores throughout the state. Substantial within-store increases in distance over time may
evidence a weak relationship between sales and lending if lenders close after the law change,
whereas declining distance over time could indicate that lenders cluster around liquor stores
which are most reliant upon lenders, even if the law change served to reduce credit access
and therefore liquor sales. This type of selection would lead to the incorrect conclusion that
a decrease in distance causes sales to decline.
27For robustness, figure A3 expands this window out to five kilometers.
28In addition, we investigated the timing of the decline in sales at the closest stores
compared to all stores and found that decline corresponds to the law change. Figure A4
in the appendix shows the normalized average residuals from the closest stores as done for
all stores in Figure 4. The closest stores average log sales exhibit qualitatively the same
behavior as all stores in the full sample.
29A triple-difference model does not reveal this larger effect to be statistically significant
at conventional levels. This is not surprising given the 95% confidence interval apparent in
Figure 5
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4 Conclusion
Our analysis provides the first empirical evidence of the connection between
payday lending and spending on liquor. We uncover a clear reduction in liquor
sales resulting from payday lending restrictions. Further investigation finds
heterogeneity in the response to the law changes consistent with known bor-
rowing patterns in larger urban environments. In addition, we find that those
liquor stores located very near to lenders at the time of the law change expe-
rience declines in sales almost three times as large as the overall average.
This finding is significant because it highlights that a segment of borrowers
may be willing to assume significant risk by borrowing in order to engage in
alcohol consumption - an activity which carries significant personal risk of its
own. The connection between payday lending restrictions and reduced liquor
purchases, therefore, suggests that the benefits to payday lending restrictions
extend beyond personal finance and may be large.
Effective payday loan regulation should recognize the potential for greater
credit access to help or harm consumers. As Carrell and Zinman (2014) high-
light, heterogeneity likely exists within the pool of payday loan users, and
external factors will influence the ratio of “productive and counter-productive
borrowers.” Lending restrictions can seek to reduce the proportion of counter
productive borrowers through the prohibition of practices known to harm con-
sumers, including those that rely upon leveraging behavioral responses such as
addiction and impulsivity. The behavioral overlap identified in the literature
between counter productive payday loan borrowers and heavy alcohol users
suggests that there exists a logical link between the two markets. The decline
21
in liquor sales documented here provides evidence that these regulations may
be effective in promoting productive borrowing.
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5 Figures
Figure 1
Total payday lenders by state
Notes: This figure shows total payday lenders by state and month.
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Figure 2
Liquor store counts by state
Notes: This figure shows total liquor stores and per capita liquor stores by state and month.
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Figure 3
Total liquor sales by state and month
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Notes: This figure shows total liquor sales by state and month, adjusted for inflation.
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Figure 4
Detrended log sales over time, net of store-by-month fixed effects, averaged
quarterly
Notes: This figure shows the residuals from a regression of log liquor store sales on a set of store-by-month fixed
effects, averaged by quarter, and normalized so that the first observation’s residual is centered at zero.
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Figure 5
The relationship between distance and effect
Notes: Graph gives estimated effect by distance to a store’s nearest lender in the month before Washington’s
law change beginning with liquor stores nearest to a lender. Moving left to right, estimates include a greater
number of stores by adding those that were increasingly further from lenders at the time of the law change.
Regressions include store-by-month fixed effects and controls. Dotted lines give the 95% confidence interval,
calculated to account for clustering at the county-level.
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6 Tables
Table 1
The effects of the PDL restrictions on liquor sales
(1) (2) (3)
(N=25,330)
Post Law×WA (Year -1) -0.007
(0.010)
[0.469]
Post Law×WA (Year 1) -0.036***
(0.011)
[0.002]
Post Law×WA (Year 2+) -0.047**
(0.018)
[0.010]
Post Law×WA -0.044*** -0.036***
(0.011) (0.010)
[0.000] [0.001]
Avg. Pre-law WA Sales 162,547 162,547 162,547
Sales Impact -7,091 -5,927 .
Controls no yes yes
Notes: All regressions include store-by-month and year-by-month fixed effects. Estimated
standard errors are reported in parentheses, adjusted for any clustering that may occur at the
county-level. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% (with p-values in
brackets).
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Table 2
Specification robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No WA-OR
Border Counties City-level Data
Post Law × WA (Year -1) -0.003 -0.013
(0.011) (0.009)
[0.784] [0.140]
Post Law × WA (Year 1) -0.025** -0.034***
(0.012) (0.012)
[0.037] [0.008]
Post Law × WA (Year 2+) -0.032* -0.039**
(0.018) (0.018)
[0.083] [0.037]
Post Law × WA -0.027** -0.027**
(0.011) (0.011)
[0.015] [0.020]
N 21,621 21,621 17,960 17,960
Avg. Pre-law WA Sales 161,518 161,518 225,884 225,884
Sales Impact -4,297 . -6,038 .
Notes: Regressions in columns 1 and 2 include store-by-month fixed effects, and city-by-month
fixed effects in columns 3 and 4. All specifications include year-by-month fixed effects and
controls. Estimated standard errors are reported in parentheses, adjusted for any clustering
that may occur at the county-level. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at
10% (with p-values in brackets).
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Table 3
The effects of the PDL restrictions on liquor sales by metropolitan status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Large Metro Smaller Metro/
Core & Fringe non-Core
Post Law × WA (Year -1) -0.005 -0.012
(0.016) (0.010)
[0.774] [0.211]
Post Law × WA (Year 1) -0.054*** -0.030**
(0.011) (0.015)
[0.001] [0.045]
Post Law × WA (Year 2+) -0.074*** -0.037*
(0.021) (0.021)
[0.007] [0.078]
Post Law × WA -0.058*** -0.025*
(0.007) (0.013)
[0.000] [0.060]
N 9,501 9,501 15,829 15,829
Avg. Pre-law WA Sales 242,540 242,540 108,534 108,534
Sales Impact -14,064 . -2,698 .
Notes: Estimates are stratified using the Centers for Disease Control’s National Center for Health Statistics
county urbanicity classification definitions. All regressions include store-by-month and year-by-month fixed
effects and controls. Estimated standard errors are reported in parentheses, adjusted for any clustering
that may occur at the county-level. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% (with
p-values in brackets).
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7 Appendix
Geocoding Procedure: Geocoding of the address data obtained from payday lender
licenses and liquor store data was done using Google Maps API service. The service provided
us longitude and latitudes for all addresses as well as allowed us to calculate walking and
driving distances between locations. To quality control the geocoding provided by Google,
we compared the original addresses from our data to the Google matched addresses. When
discrepancies were found, we manually geocoded the address. The manual geocoding usually
involved correcting an error in the street address and then using Google Maps to find the
correct address and longitude and latitude. In some cases, Google Street View was used to
find the actual store front of the business to obtain the address.
To calculate distances between liquor stores and payday lenders, we first narrowed the
pairs using straight line distance obtained from the longitudes and latitudes. Specifically,
we kept all liquor store and lender pairs within a given radial distance of one another. We
then obtained the Google walking distance between all locations. We use Google walking
distances because it provides a better measure of proximity than straight line or driving
distance. The two major cities in our data, Portland and Seattle, both have large bodies
of water in close proximity. Therefore, straight line distances may be misleading because
locations on the opposite sides of a body of water may be linearly close, but for our purposes
quite far apart. Likewise driving distance provided by Google factor in one-way streets.
Therefore, a payday lender that is across the street from a liquor store may for example
have a driving distance of half a kilometer if they are located on a one-way street, where a
driver must circle around the block to reach the destination. Walking distances solves both
of these concerns.
Table A1
Oregon and Washington Liquor Prices
OR WA OR WA OR WA OR WA
Mean $20.58 $24.44 $21.24 $25.35 $23.99 $24.44 $23.91 $22.71
Min Price $6.80 $9.10 $6.80 $9.40 $6.80 $9.65 $6.75 $9.55
2009 2010 2011 2012
Notes: The mean price includes all alcoholic beverages for sale in the states during a given year. This
includes mini-bottles that retail for under $2.00 to fine whiskey that retails for over $2,000. The “Min
Price” is the minimum price for a 750ml bottle of 80 proof liquor available in each state. Vodka, rum,
gin, tequila, and whiskey are all available for within about 20 cents of the minimum prices. The Oregon
price in 2009 includes the 50 cent per bottle surcharge. The Washington prices in 2009 do not include the
change in markup. The reason for this discrepancy is due to the dating of our liquor price data.
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Figure A1
Residuals over time from store fixed effects model, averaged by state
Notes: Average log sales for Washington and Oregon net of store fixed effects
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Table A2
Control Variable Definitions
Controls Frequency Description Source
Unemployment Rate Monthly Non-seasonally adjusted county unemployment rate as measured by the
US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Federal Reserve Economic
Database
HH Median Income Yearly County-level household median income. U.S. Census Bureau
Pop. Below Poverty
Line
Yearly Proportion of the population with incomes below the national poverty
threshold by county.
U.S. Census Bureau
Temporary Closures Monthly Indicator variable for liquor stores that takes a one in every month
in which a store does not operate for all state mandated business
days. The variable is identified by press releases announcing store clo-
sures available at http://www.oregon.gov/OLCC/pages/news.aspx and
http://www.liq.wa.gov/pressreleases/main for Oregon and Washington,
respectively. The indicator variable also takes a one for liquor stores
mentioned in press releases as an alternative to visit during the store’s
closure.
Authors’ calculations
Store Moves Monthly Indicator variable that takes a one in all months following a lo-
cation change of a liquor store. Stores that do not move, but
may be affected by a moving store also receive a one for all
months following a move. Store moves are identified by press
releases available at http://www.oregon.gov/OLCC/pages/news.aspx
and http://www.liq.wa.gov/pressreleases/main for Oregon and Wash-
ington, respectively. Stores affected by a store move are identified by
the press releases themselves which often offer alternative store sugges-
tions and by using Google maps driving and walking distances. If a
store moves within 500 meters of an existing store with no other stores
within that distance, then indicator variable is set to one
Authors’ calculations
New Entrants Monthly Indicator variable that takes a one in all months for a liquor store
affected by a new entrant to the market after January 1st 2010.
Any store within 1 kilometer (straight line distance) of the new en-
trant is deemed as affected. New stores are identified by press
releases available at http://www.oregon.gov/OLCC/pages/news.aspx
and http://www.liq.wa.gov/pressreleases/main for Oregon and Wash-
ington, respectively.
Authors’ calculations
Notes: Control variable descriptions. Data and replication files available from the authors upon request.
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Table A3
Standard error cluster check
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(N=25,330)
Post Law×WA -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.036***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]
SE Cluster Level none Store City County
Notes: All regressions include year-by-month and store-by-month fixed effects and controls.
Estimated standard errors are reported in parentheses, adjusted for any clustering at various
levels. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% (with p-values in
brackets).
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Figure A2
Cumulative store counts by distance to a lender
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Notes: Graph gives the number of liquor stores within various walking distances of any lender in the month
prior to Washington’s lending restrictions (December 2009).
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Figure A3
The relationship between distance and effect magnitude
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Notes: Graph gives estimated effect by distance to a store’s nearest lender in the month before Washington’s
law change beginning with liquor stores nearest to a lender. Moving left to right, estimates include a greater
number of stores by adding those that were increasingly further from lenders at the time of the law change.
Regressions include year-by-month and store-by-month fixed effects, and controls. Dotted lines give the 95%
confidence interval, calculated to account for clustering at the county-level.
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Figure A4
Normalized average de-trended log liquor store sales for stores within 10 meters of
a PDL
Notes: This figure shows the average residuals from a regression on liquor stores within 10 meters of PDL the
month prior to the law change (December 2009) of log liquor store sales on a set of store-by-month fixed effects,
normalized so that the first observation’s residual is centered at zero.
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